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Abstract. In this paper we present a dynamic model of an organization. It is
shown that the quality of the members of the organization may change
cyclically and that even if the organization promotes excellence, the organi
zation may end up populated mostly by mediocre agents.
1 Introduction
The last two decades have seen a growing interest in the theory of organi
zation. Using the tools of game theory and contract theory, economists have
begun to understand some basic features like incentive schemes, organiza
tional forms or property rights inside the firm. But very little attention has
been paid to the interplay between the internal structure of the organization
and the environment in a dynamic set up.
In this paper, we focus on the fact that organizations must offer selective
prizes say, promotions in order to attract people inside the organization.
Unfortunately these prizes attract all kind of agents. Suppose that agents are
free to enter but the organization has a technology for distinguishing
(imperfectly) ‘‘talented’’ from ‘‘untalented’’ agents. One should expect that if
the technology is able to select talented agents with an arbitrarily large
probabilily, this should stop untalented agents from entering into the orga
nization. But this is not necessarily the case: In a dynamic setting, the
organization may be subject to cycles. And if the organization is well
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managed by a talented agent, this provides an extra incentive for untalented
agents to enter even if they know that they will get no prize.
In this paper we propose a simple model characterized by the following
features:
1. The organization is subject to entry and exit. We model this by an over-
lapping generation model in which agents are free to enter and live for two
periods.
2. Agents are heterogeneous. We assume that they belong to two categories:
Talented or untalented.
3. The organization is hierarchic. In the first period, agents perform some
routine task for which all agents are equally capable. At the beginning of
the second period, one of them is chosen to be the boss. The other agents
have the choice of leaving the organization if they wish to do so.
4. There are externalities inside the organization. If the boss is talented all
other agents are better off than in a situation in which the boss is untal-
ented.
For the sake of tractability we ignore important features of organizations
such as competition among organizations, loyalties, durable capital, com-
plexity and incentives.1 In this framework, we introduce two additional
simplifications in order to keep the model tractable: a) The rules under which
the boss is chosen are exogenous. b) A talented agent does not create exter-
nalities if he is not the boss and his productivity is the same as the produc-
tivity of an untalented agent in the routine task.
Our model may be suited for studying some aspects of organizations such
as non profit organizations, a political party such as the communist party in
the extinct U.S.S.R. or the fascist party in Mussolini’s Italy, or a department
in an university.2 In order to couch the previous items in our framework it is
better to think of a small branch of the organization, such as a small town
branch of the communist party, and not, say, the Politburo.
Our leading example is that of an abbey in medieval Europe. Early on in
their lives, farmers decide to enter into the abbey or to remain peasants. If a
young peasant decides to become a monk he will spend the next period (say
25 years) copying manuscripts and farming according to the direction of the
current abbot. In our model, when entering the abbey, young peasants do not
know who the abbot will be, but they know the probability of the abbot being
1 See Radner (1991) for an overview of incentives in a dynamic setting and Sjostrom
and Weitzman (1996) for a model where competition among organizations helps to
maintain quality at a efficient level.
2 In the latter case, free entry is motivated by the fact that, given the large demand for
higher education, restrictions to become a faculty member were not important in many
parts of Europe.
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talented (or untalented).3 This probability is exogenously given and it might
be different for talented and untalented agents reflecting the degree of adverse
selection inside the organization. At the beginning of the second period, there
is a lottery involving all peasants who entered in the previous period and a
new abbot is appointed (for the next 25 years). We decide to model the
election as a lottery to capture the uncertainties associated with the election of
the new abbot. Agents who participated in the election other than the abbot
either leave or spend this new period (25 more years) in the abbey.
Our equilibrium concept is very simple. Agents are expected utility max-
imizers and know all the relevant parameters of the model. The number of
talented (resp. untalented) monks entering the abbey is such that the undis-
counted expected utility of being a monk equals reservation utility. If the
latter is larger than the undiscounted expected utility that a talented (resp.
untalented) farmer can obtain by entering the abbey, no talented (resp.
untalented) farmer enters monastic life.
In Section 3, we focus on steady states (SS), where each cohort has the
same number of talented and untalented monks as the previous one. We show
that under reasonable assumptions, there is always a unique SS. The SS can
be of three different classes: A SS with untalented monks only (a SSU), a SS
with talented monks only (a SST) and a SS with both talented and untalented
monks (a SSM). Next we study the dependence of SS on the two main
parameters of the model, namely the relative probability that the abbot is
talented (denoted by k) and the amount of positive externality imposed by a
talented abbot (denoted by d). When k is low, talented people are not at-
tracted into the organization and only SSU exist. For intermediate values of k
only SSM exists. If d is relatively low, for large k only SST exists. But if d is
large, there is no SST, no matter how high k is and the only SS is a SSM. The
explanation of this fact is that for k large the abbot is almost surely talented.
Untalented monks receive a large externality from a talented abbot and they
keep entering into the abbey even when their chances to become abbot are
almost zero. We call this the umbrella effect.
In Sect. 4, we analyze the dynamic system. If k and d are such that only
SSU (resp. SST) exists the SSU (SST) is globally stable. For values of k and d
for which a SSM exists, there are several possibilities. The SSM can be
globally stable, locally unstable or it might, under exceptional circumstances,
produce a cycle with two values: a cohort with a relatively large number of
talented monks is followed by a cohort with a relatively large number of
untalented monks and this cohort is followed by a cohort identical to the first
one, etc.
3 An alternative assumption is that young peasants know who will be the abbot for the
next period. But given that our periods are interpreted as consisting of a large number
of years, we think that the formalization chosen here better captures the uncertainties
associated with the future performance of the current abbot.
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The paper ends with a section gathering our conclusions and suggesting
further possibilities of research in this framework.
2 The model
There is a large population of potential monks composed of two kind of
agents, talented and untalented. They live for two periods. At the beginning
of the first period they might join the abbey. The number of talented (resp.
untalented) agents entering monastic life in period t is denoted by ntT (resp.
ntU ). In order to simplify the analysis, we will disregard integer problems and
so we will handle the number of talented and untalented monks as a con-
tinuous variable. The abbot for the period t þ 1 is chosen among all members
of the cohort that entered at t. We model the election as a lottery. The
probability that a particular talented (resp. untalented) monk is chosen to be
the abbot in period t þ 1 is
k
kntT þ ntU
; ðresp: 1
kntT þ ntU
Þ:
Thus, the probability that the abbot is talented (resp. untalented) is
kntT
kntT þ ntU
; ðresp. n
t
U
kntT þ ntU
Þ:
The parameter k measures the taste for talent inside the organization. If
0 < k < 1 any talented farmer has lower chances of becoming an abbot than
any untalented farmer. If k ¼ 1; all agents have equal chances (this might be
interpreted as pure adverse selection). Finally when k !1 the probability
that the chosen abbot is talented approaches one. We remark that the election
of the abbot might be governed by deterministic rules. In this case, k reflects
the uncertainties associated with the process of election (coalitions, loyalties,
etc.) as they are perceived by entrants. We will assume that k is exogenously
given, i.e., it is set by the Vatican or by customary uses inside the monastery.
In the first period, monks perform a routine task for which all of them
(talented or untalented) are equally capable. Let w be the utility of a monk in
his first period if the abbot is untalented and dw his utility if the abbot is
talented. Since a talented abbot will provide better design and organization of
the basic tasks performed by the monks we assume that d > 1. Let V be the
utility of the abbot.4 Finally, let uT (resp. uU ) be the lifetime reservation utility
of a talented (resp. untalented) farmer who does not join the abbey.
After the election the monks of the older generation who lost the election
can remain in the abbey, or may leave. We do not model this choice since it is
4 To simplify notation, we assume that the utility of the abbot is independent of his
type. It can be shown that all our conclusions hold if the utility of the abbot depends
on his type.
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immaterial for the model. Let w 0T (resp. w
0
U ) be the expected utility in the
second period for a talented (resp. untalented) monk other than the abbot if
the abbot is untalented and w00T (resp. w
00
U ) be the expected utility of a talented
(resp. untalented) monk other than the abbot if the abbot is talented. We
assume that w00T > w
0
T and w
00
U > w
0
U .
Let us now concentrate on the decision problem of a potential monk. In
the first period he can obtain w with probability
nt 1U
knt 1T þ nt 1U
and dw with probability
knt 1T
knt 1T þ nt 1U
:
Thus his expected utility in the first period is
wðdknt 1T þ nt 1U Þ
knt 1T þ nt 1U
:
We remark that expected utility in the first period is independent of the type.
However in the second period the expected utility of talented and untalented
monks are different. Let us consider the case of a talented agent first. In the
second period there are three possible outcomes. An untalented monk may be
chosen to be the abbot with probability
ntU
kntT þ ntU
and, in this case, he would get w 0T : He can be the abbot with probability
k
kntT þ ntU
so he would get V : Finally another talented monk may be the abbot. Since all
the probabilities must add up to one this event occurs with probability
1 n
t
U þ k
kntT þ ntU
¼ kðn
t
T  1Þ
kntT þ ntU
:
In this case he gets w00T . Adding all the terms, the undiscounted lifetime ex-
pected utility (ET ) of a talented monk is5
ET  wðdkn
t 1
T þ nt 1U Þ
knt 1T þ nt 1U
þ kV þ w
0
T n
t
U þ kw00T ðntT  1Þ
kntT þ ntU
: ð1Þ
A similar argument for a typical untalented monk shows that his expected
lifetime utility (EU ) is
5 It can be shown that all our main conclusions hold if utility is discounted.
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EU  wðdkn
t 1
T þ nt 1U Þ
knt 1T þ nt 1U
þ V þ kw
00
Un
t
T þ w 0U ðntU  1Þ
kntT þ ntU
: ð2Þ
Let the right hand side of Eqs. (1) and (2) be written as
ET ðnt 1T ; nt 1U ; ntU ; ntT Þ;EU ðnt 1T ; nt 1U ; ntU ; ntT ÞÞ:
Definition 1. A Dynamic Equilibrium (DE) given an initial condition ðn0U ; n0T Þ is
a sequence ðntU ; ntT Þt¼1;...;1 fulfilling the following two conditions:
ET ðnt 1T ; nt 1U ; ntU ; ntT Þ  uT and if strict inequality holds then ntT ¼ 0;
ð3Þ
EU ðnt 1T ; nt 1U ; ntU ; ntT Þ  uU and if strict inequality holds then ntU ¼ 0:
ð4Þ
Thus, a DE requires for each cohort that entry into the abbey reaps any
possible utility gain that agents can obtain by entering into monastic life.6
A first glimpse into the properties of a DE can be obtained by studying the
particular case in which in each period, the entering cohort is identical to the
previous one. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 2. A Steady State (SS) is a pair ðnU ; nT Þ such that:
ET ðnT ; nU ; nU ; nT Þ  uT and if strict inequality holds then nT ¼ 0; ð5Þ
EU ðntT ; nU ; nU ; nT Þ  uU and if strict inequality holds then nU ¼ 0: ð6Þ
Taking into account (1) and (2), Eqs. (5) and (6) can be written as:
nU ðwþ w 0T  uT Þ þ kðV  w00T Þ  knT ðuT  wd w00T Þ; ð7Þ
nU ðwþ w 0U  uU Þ þ V  w 0U  knT ðuU  wd w00U Þ: ð8Þ
with inequality strict if the corresponding number of monks is zero.
3 Steady states
In order to study the existence of a steady states, some assumptions are
needed.
6 A more stringent definition of a dynamic equilibrium would require that further
entry from either type yields an expected utility for this type less than the reservation
utility.
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Assumption 1. V > maxðw00T ;w00U ; dwÞ:
This assumption says that the utility of the abbot is greater than any other
utility that individuals can get in any period (in other words, ‘‘It’s good to be
the king’’ after the famous line by Mel Brooks, History of the World, Part
One 1981). Thus, the chosen abbot has incentives to remain in the abbey.
Notice that if the reservation utility of a type is low enough; an infinite
number of farmers will join the monastery. Thus, the existence of a SS re-
quires that the reservation utility of both types is large enough. In fact we
require the following:
Assumption 2. uT > dwþ w00T and uU > wþ w 0U :
This assumption says that a farmer can get outside the monastery at least
as much he can get working in the routine task inside the monastery when
directed by an abbot of his own type. The interpretation is that a peasant can
perform a similar task inside and outside the monastery but a non monastic
life provides some extra utility. Two consequences of this assumption are that
for a talented farmer to be attracted to monastic life he must have some
chance of becoming abbot and that for an untalented farmer to become
attracted to monastic life he must have either the chance to become an abbot
or to have his work being directed by a talented abbot.
Finally we assume the following:
Assumption 3.
uT
uU
>
wðd 1Þ þ w00T  w 0T
wðd 1Þ þ w00U  w 0U
:
The numerator (resp. denominator) of the right hand side of the above
condition is the marginal effect of the talent of the abbot on payoffs obtained
by a talented (resp. untalented) farmer. Thus, the right hand side of the
inequality is a relative measure of the impact of a talented abbot on payoffs.
Assumption 3 says that the ratio of lifetime reservation utility of talented over
untalented farmers is greater than the ratio of gains due to the talent of the
abbot. In other words, one’s talent is more important to success than other
people’s talent. In the special case in which payoffs in the second period do
not depend on types w00T ¼ w00U , w 0T ¼ w 0U and this assumption reads uT > uU .
In the rest of the paper we will assume that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold.
Now we are prepared to tackle the issue of existence of SS. It is clear that
there are three possible SS. A SS in which only untalented monks join the
monastery (SSU), a mixed SS in which both talented and untalented monks
join the monastery (SSM) and a SS in which only talented monks join the
monastery (SST).
Let us first concentrate on the SSU. From (7) and (8) it follows that
nT ¼ 0;nU ¼
V w 0U
uU ww 0U
and for ET < uT ;k<
ðV w 0U ÞðuT ww 0T Þ
ðV w00U ÞðuU ww 0U Þ
:
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Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that expression in the right hand side of the
inequality is positive. Thus, a SSU exists when k small enough.
Let us now compute a SSM. From (7) and (8) it follows that
nT ¼
kðV  w00T ÞðuU  w w 0U Þ  ðV  w 0U ÞðuT  w w 0T Þ
k½ðuT  dw w00T ÞðuU  w w 0U Þ  ðuT  w 0T  wÞðuU  dw w00U Þ
nU ¼
ðV  w 0U ÞðuT  dw w00T Þ  kðV  w00T ÞðuU  dw w00U Þ
ðuT  dw w00T ÞðuU  w w 0U Þ  ðuT  w 0T  wÞðuU  dw w00U Þ
:
A little bit of algebra shows that Assumption 3 implies that the denomi-
nator of the expressions defining nT and nU is positive. Thus, the non nega-
tivity conditions for the numerators boil down to
ðV  w 0U ÞðuT  w w 0T Þ
ðV  w00U ÞðuU  w w 0U Þ
 k  ðV  w
0
U ÞðuT  dw w00T Þ
ðV  w00T ÞðuU  dw w00U Þ
;
where the second inequality only needs to hold when uU > dwþ w00U : Other-
wise the numerator of the expression of nU and, consequently, n

U are always
positive.
Finally, in a SST we have that
nT ¼
V w00T
uT  dww00T
;nU ¼ 0 and for EU < uU ;k >
ðV w 0U ÞðuT  dww00T Þ
ðV w00T ÞðuU  dww00U Þ
:
The previous arguments are summarized in the following result:
Theorem 1. For every k there is a unique SS. For values of k low enough there
only exists SSU. For intermediate values of k there only exists SSM. For high
values of k a SST exists only if uU > dwþ w00U : If uU  dwþ w00U only SSM
exists.7
The interpretation of Theorem 1 is that if the value of k is low, only SSU
exists since talented farmers have little chance of becoming promoted and
thus they have no incentive to join the monastery. For intermediate values of
k both talented and untalented farmers are attracted to the monastery. For
large values of k there are two cases: If d is relatively low or the reservation
value of untalented farmers is relatively high (i.e. if uU > dwþ w00U ) they do
not enter into the monastery because their chances to become abbot, mea-
sured by
nU
knT þ nU
;
are small. In fact, this probability decreases with k and tends to zero when k
tends to infinity. But if d is relatively high or the reservation value of untal-
ented farmers is relatively low (i.e. uU  dwþ w00U Þ, they enter the monastery
7 If the number of monks is bound to be an integer, several SS may exist for a given k.
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in large numbers, because even though their chances to become an abbot are
small, the chances that they will be directed by a talented person are high and
this provides extra utility with respect to the utility they would get as farmers.
In this case, the Vatican can not achieve abbeys populated by talented monks
only by setting k arbitrarily large. On the contrary, it is easily computed that
nU
nT
!1 when k !1:
Thus an increase in the probability that a talented person becomes the abbot
increases the number of untalented monks relative to the number of talented
monks. We will call this the umbrella effect because it reflects the role of the
leader as an umbrella of the mediocre.
4 Dynamic paths
In this section we provide an analysis of the dynamic equilibrium. Due to the
complexity of the trajectories we will focus on the special case in which
expected utilities in the second period do not depend on the type of the monk.
Thus, w 0T ¼ w 0U  w 0, say and w00U ¼ w00T  w00 ð> w 0Þ: An extreme form of this
assumption is when monks can not leave the monastery and get w (resp. dw) if
the abbot is untalented (talented). In this case w 0 ¼ w and w00 ¼ dw.
Assumptions 1-2-3 read now V > maxðdw;w00Þ; uT > wdþ w00;
uU > wþ w 0; and uT > uU : Thus, the assumption made above says that talent
is payoff relevant only when an agent is young. In order to simplify notation
let
at  wðn
t
U þ kdntT Þ
ntU þ kntT
:
It is easily seen that dw  at  w: With this notation in hand and for the
special case considered in this section, expected utility for talented and
untalented monks (Eqs. (1) and (2)) can be written as follows:
ET  at 1 þ kV þ w
0ntU þ kw00ðntT  1Þ
kntT þ ntU
: ð9Þ
EU  at 1 þ V þ kw
00ntT þ w 0ðntU  1Þ
kntT þ ntU
: ð10Þ
Let us consider first the case in which k is such that there is SSU only, i.e.
k <
ðV  w 0ÞðuT  w w 0Þ
ðV  w00ÞðuU  w w 0Þ :
Suppose that in period t both types of monks enter the monastery. Then,
ntT ¼
kðV  w00ÞðuU  w 0  at 1Þ  ðV  w 0ÞðuT  w 0  at 1Þ
kðw00  w 0ÞðuT  uU Þ :
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Since ntT  0; uU > w 0 þ at 1: Thus,
k  ðV  w
0ÞðuT  w 0  at 1Þ
ðV  w00ÞðuU  w 0  at 1Þ :
Combining both inequalities involving k we get uT ðw at 1Þ > uU ðw at 1Þ
which is impossible. Suppose now that only talented farmers enter. This
implies that
V  w 0 þ kw00ntT
kntT
þ at 1 < uU and ntT ¼
V  w00
uT  w 0  at 1 :
These equations imply that
k  ðV  w
0ÞðuT  w00  at 1Þ
ðV  w00ÞðuU  w00  at 1Þ :
Combining both inequalities involving k we get uU ðat 1  w w 0 þ w00ÞÞ >
uT ðat 1  w w 0 þ w00Þ which implies at 1  w < w 0  w00 which is impossible
because the term on the left hand side is non negative and the term on the
right hand side is negative. So there can not be a period in which only talented
farmers enter.
The last possibility is that only untalented farmers enter at t. In this case
Eqs. (7) and (8) imply that
ntU ¼
V  w 0
uU  w 0  at 1 and k <
ðV  w 0ÞðuT  w 0  at 1Þ
ðV  w00ÞðuU  w 0  at 1Þ :
It is easy to show (by contradiction) that the last inequality is implied by the
bound on k in a SSU: Finally notice that for t > 1 at ¼ w and the equations
above coincide with those defining a SSU. Thus, we have proved the fol-
lowing:
Theorem 2. Suppose that only SSU exists. Then, there is a unique DE which
from Period 2 on coincides with the SSU.
A similar argument proves the following analogous result:
Theorem 3. Suppose that only SST exists. Then, there is a unique DE which
from Period 2 on coincides with the SST.
Theorems 2 and 3 say that both SSU and SST are globally stable.
Let us now concentrate on the case in which a SSM exists. Let us look for
a DE in which both types enter. In this case, Eqs. (3), (4), (9) and (10) imply
ntT ¼
kðV  w00ÞðuU  w 0  at 1Þ  ðV  w 0ÞðuT  w 0  at 1Þ
kðw00  w 0ÞðuT  uU Þ  fT ða
t 1Þ;
ð11Þ
10
ntU ¼
kðV  w 00Þðw 00 þ at 1  uU Þ  ðV  w 0Þðw 00 þ at 1  uT Þ
ðwz00  w 0ÞðuT  uU Þ  fU ða
t 1Þ:
ð12Þ
The corresponding non-negativity constraints are:
RuU  uT þ w 0ð1 RÞ  at 1ðR 1Þ  w00ð1 RÞ þ RuU  uT : ð13Þ
where R  kðV  w
00Þ
ðV  w 0Þ :
Notice that the bounds for k in a SSM and w00 > w 0 imply that R > 1 and thus
(13) can be written as
RuU  uT
R 1  w
0  at 1  RuU  uT
R 1  w
00: ð14Þ
Equation (14) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a DE in which
both types enter. Moreover, (14) implies that the inequalities defining a SSM
hold since
RuU uT w 0ðR1Þ at 1ðR1ÞwðR1Þ;¼)R uT ww
0
uU ww 0 : ð15Þ
RuU uT þw00ð1RÞ at 1ðR1Þ ðR1Þwd¼)R uT dww
00
uU dww00:
ð16Þ
It is easy to check that the inequalities on the right hand side of (15) and (16)
are identical to those defining a SSM.
Suppose that the value of at 1 is such that (14) holds. We plug equations
(11) and (12) in the definition of at and get an equation relating at and at 1;
denoted by at ¼ f ðat 1Þ. Notice that from (11) and (12) it follows that
ntU þ kntT ¼
kðV  w00Þ  ðV  w 0Þ
uT  uU ;
i.e. ntU þ kntT is independent of a: Thus,
dat
dat 1
¼ w
ntU þ kntT
ð dfU
dat 1
þ dk dfT
dat 1
Þ ¼ wð1 dÞ
w00  w 0 < 0: ð17Þ
We have three cases. If the impact of the talent of the abbot on the utility of
other monks is larger in the second period than in the first period,
w00  w 0 > wðd 1Þ: Thus, datdat 1 > 1, and the system is stable. If the reverse
inequality holds, da
t
dat 1 < 1 and the system is unstable. Finally, in the
exceptional case in which the impact of the talent of the abbot on the utility of
other monks is identical in both periods, w00  w 0 ¼ wðd 1Þ; @at
@at 1 ¼ 1.8 In
8 This case arises if, for instance, monks can not leave the monastery and get w (resp.
dw) if the abbot is untalented (talented).
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this case, the DE is cyclical. We start with a value of a0 which implies certain
value of a1 ¼ f ða0Þ. In period 2, we have that a2 ¼ a0 , in period 3, a3 ¼ a1, so
on and so forth. Therefore, ntT and n
t
U take only two values.
9 This case,
though, depends on a very special configuration of parameters.
In order to tackle the case where (14) does not hold, let us assume that the
bounds defining an SSM hold strictly. Suppose that the first inequality in (14)
is violated in period t, i.e.
RuU  uT
R 1  w
0 < at 1:
This implies that ntT ¼ 0 and, thus, at ¼ w: But in period t þ 1; the first
inequality in (14) must hold, i.e.
RuU  uT
R 1  w
0  at ¼ w:
because if not, RðuU  w w 0Þ < uT  w w 0 and this would violate (15).
Thus, in t þ 1, the first inequality of (14) holds.
Suppose that the second inequality of (14) is not fulfilled at t þ 1, i.e.
RuU  uT
R 1  w
00 > at ¼ w: ð18Þ
But then, ntþ1U ¼ 0, so atþ1 ¼ dw: Thus, in period t þ 2 this inequality holds
because if not we would have
RuU  uT
R 1  w
00 > atþ1 ¼ wd¼)uT  dw w00 < RðuU  dw w00Þ;
contradicting (16). The first inequality in Eq. (14) is also satisfied in t þ 2
because if it were not
RuU  uT
R 1  w
0 < atþ1 ¼ dw < dw w00¼)RuU  uT
R 1 < dw w
00;
and this contradicts Eq. (16). Thus, after two periods atþ1 enters in the
interval defined by (14). A similar analysis can be done to deal with the case
where the other inequality in (13) is violated in period t, i.e.
RuU  uT
R 1  dw > a
t 1:
All these findings are summarized in the following:
Theorem 4. Suppose that only SSM exists. If w00  w 0 > wðd 1Þ the dynamic
system achieves the SSM in, at most, three periods. If w00  w 0 < wðd 1Þ the
SSM is locally unstable. If w00  w 0 ¼ wðd 1Þ from Period 3 on, the DE
exhibits permanent cyclic behavior with two values only.
9 It can be shown that the average of these values is the SSM.
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5 Conclusions
This paper studies dynamic organizations using well-known concepts: Over-
lapping generations (introduced by Samuelson and used extensively in
monetary economics), externalities (used from Pigou on to analyze market
failure), hierarchies (that play an important role in the writings of Williams)
and types (from Vickrey and Harsanyi, an idea that pervades the whole game
theory). What we found in this paper is that assumptions on how talent
affects payoffs pervade the analysis and drive the main results.
Our analysis has produced two main conclusions.
On the one hand, organizations having a homogeneous population in the
steady state are stable. Organizations in which the population is not homo-
geneous in the steady state may be stable, unstable or they might even cycle.
On the other hand, an organization with high standards of promotion can
be mostly populated by untalented persons. Why? Because untalented people
may live very well under the direction of a talented person, i.e., the umbrella
effect. This effect provides an explanation to the casual observation that,
sometimes, intelligent leaders are surrounded by not-so-intelligent people.
The usual explanation of this fact is that, some intelligent people do not like
to be surrounded by potential challengers. Without denying that this may be
the case in some instances, our analysis provides an alternative answer:
Intelligent bosses provide an umbrella under which the mediocre prosper. In
other words, if untalented agents profit more in relative terms than the tal-
ented ones from having a good boss, untalented agents will enter in larger
numbers than talented agents. Of course, in real organizations, there might be
forces operating in the opposite direction, for instance, the entry of untal-
ented agents may be restricted by entry examinations. However our point is
that there is a tendency for the relatively untalented to enter in large numbers,
no matter how high the standard of promotion is. An unpleasant consequence
of this is that the outcome of a policy of excellence may be not excellence but
mediocrity.
The model can be extended in several directions. We might introduce
several bosses. Also it would be interesting to consider that k is endogenous.10
For instance, k might depend on the current number of talented and untal-
ented monks. For instance if the abbey is populated mostly by talented monks
there might be a strong tendency to push k to a high value. In this framework,
SSU and SST would remain as dynamic equilibria because they are globally
stable and because SSU and SST remain as SS when k decreases or increases
respectively. What happens in the case in which only SSM exists is not clear.
But the most challenging extension is to a general equilibrium framework.
This is left for future research.
10 See Sobel (2001) for a dynamic model of endogenous standards.
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